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Abstract: We conduct a field experiment in Vietnamese villages to explore the effect of the 
prospect theory and of quasi-hyperbolic time preferences parameters on trust and trustworthiness. 
We find that risk aversion, loss aversion and present bias do not influence trustors’ decisions, but 
a higher time discounting increases the amount sent in the South of Vietnam and probability 
weighting decreases it in the North. If time discounting and loss aversion do not influence 
trustworthiness, we show that more risk averse and less present biased trustees return a higher 
share of their wealth to the trustors. These results suggest that adopting another perspective than 
the expected utility theory and the exponential discounting approach of time preferences enables 
to uncover some channels by which risk and intertemporal time preferences influence trusting 
behavior in societies. 
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“Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted 
over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be 
explained by the lack of mutual confidence”. 
Kenneth Arrow (1972) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A large literature has shown that trust contributes to growth and development, political success, 
and social well-being (Knack and Kiefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; 
Guiso et al., 2009; Algan and Cahuc, 2010). Trust reduces dramatically transaction costs and 
contributes to the efficiency of economic organizations (Fukuyama, 1995). In contrast, low trust 
increases demand for regulation (Aghion et al., 2010) and low levels of trustworthiness hinder 
the development of social capital necessary for economic development (Neace, 2004). Trust and 
trustworthiness are also necessary for democratization (Tilly, 2005). Better understanding their 
determinants is therefore fundamental. 
In this paper, we investigate how trust and trustworthiness relate to risk aversion, loss 
aversion, and time preferences by conducting an artefactual field experiment in villages in the 
North and the South of Vietnam. We use a game in which trust is proxied by the amount sent by 
a trustor to an anonymous trustee. In contrast with the standard game of Berg et al. (1995) but 
like in Buchan et al. (2006), the trustee can send back any amount of his total wealth (i.e. the 
tripled amount received from the trustor and an initial endowment). We can use the percentage 
of total wealth returned to the trustor as a proxy of trustworthiness. The novel contribution of our 
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approach is that we do not study risk attitudes in the framework of the expected utility theory in 
contrast with most of the previous literature on trust, but we use instead the tools provided by the 
prospect theory to have a more precise understanding of the individual underpinnings of social 
preferences. Another novelty of our approach is that we consider the possible links between trust 
and time preferences. So far, no study has investigated this link although we suspect that 
individuals’ inter-temporal preferences may impact their attitudes in the trust game.   
Although trusting behavior has been widely studied either through value surveys or 
experimentally (Glaeser et al., 2000), there is no consensus on its links with basic human 
preferences (Camerer, 2003; Fehr, 2009). Both behavioral studies (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; 
Cox, 2004; Ashraf et al., 2006) and neuroscientific studies (Kosfeld et al. 2005; Baumgartner et 
al., 2008) have shown that social preferences, notably betrayal aversion (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 
2004; Bohnet et al., 2008), play a major role in trusting behavior. But this does not exclude a 
role of risk preferences in trusting behavior (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2001; Cook and Cooper, 
2003). Indeed, trusting others means making oneself vulnerable to a counterpart who can decide 
to reciprocate or betray, which creates uncertainty. For example, Karlan (2005) and Schechter 
(2007) have found that higher trust correlates with less risk aversion, even after controlling for 
altruism (see also Fehr, 2009, and Naef and Schupp, 2009). In contrast, Eckel and Wilson (2004), 
Ashraf et al. (2006), Houser et al. (2010), and McEvily et al. (2012) have found no correlation 
between trust and risk attitudes.  
The unclear link between risk attitudes and trusting behavior in the literature is possibly 
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because most measures involve lotteries that may not capture the attitudes towards strategic 
uncertainty. Moreover, many studies do not elicit individual risk preferences but simply compare 
the distributions of decisions in trust and risk games (Houser et al., 2008).2 Finally, the studies 
that elicit individual risk attitudes usually assume that individuals behave according to the 
expected utility (EU, henceforth) theory and only characterize risk preferences by choices of 
lotteries in the domain of gains.3 Yet, this assumption has been frequently challenged and the 
prospect theory offers a richer approach to risk attitudes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1992; Wakker, 2010). EU theory may be inadequate if participants evaluate the 
possible outcomes of their decisions relative to a reference point or if there is an endowment 
effect. One can hypothesize that loss averse individuals are less willing to trust others because 
sending money to a trustee without any guarantee of return may entail a loss in income; if people 
are loss averse, analyzing the link between trust and risk preferences only based on the concavity 
of the utility function will bias the estimates. For that reason, we expand the measurement of risk 
preferences to incorporate prospect theory like in Tanaka et al. (2010).4 We measure the 
correlation between trust and the curvature of the utility function, nonlinear probability 
                                                
2 In Ashraf et al. (2006), people make choices between a risky gamble and a deterministic payoff. In the risk game 
of Schechter (2007) and McEvily et al. (2012) players choose the amount of a bet which return depends on the roll 
of a die. Snijders and Keren (1999) measure risk by varying the payoff structure in the trust game. Bohnet and 
Zeckhauser (2004) and Bohnet et al. (2008) compare behavior facing social risk and state risk. 
3 In Eckel and Wilson (2004), risk attitudes are elicited through choices between lotteries. But if these attitudes do 
not predict behavior in the trust game, they do not predict either decisions in their risk game in which subjects 
choose between lotteries and certain amounts. Houser et al. (2008) also elicit individual risk attitudes with the Holt 
and Laury procedure and show that they predict behavior in risk games but not in trust games. Karlan (2005) 
proxies risk attitudes by comparisons of the participants’ borrowings and savings in a microcredit program. 
4 In contrast to Tanaka et al. (2010), we play first the risk preferences experiment to avoid that payments from 
previous games affect the reference point in prospect theory. We also decrease the number of binary choices in the 
risk experiment to facilitate the participant’s comprehension.    
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weighting and loss aversion.5  
We also provide the first analysis of the links between behavior in the trust game and time 
preferences. Our intuition is that in real life settings, more patient people may be more likely to 
behave in ways that preserve long-term mutually beneficial relationships, while more impulsive 
people may not be able to resist the temptation of behaving selfishly. We hypothesize that 
self-control (captured by the present bias parameter) and future orientation may motivate 
individuals to send more and to return more instead of taking profits right away. From a 
theoretical perspective, studies have shown that it is too restrictive to measure time preferences 
by an exponential discount rate (see Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001; Tanaka et al., 
2010). For that reason, we estimate a quasi-hyperbolic function following Benhabib et al. (2010) 
and relate discounting rate and present bias to trustors’ and trustees’ decisions. 
Finally, since trust and the institutional structure of a country may be strongly tied together 
(Hardin, 1992; Knack and Keefer, 1997), we conducted the experiment in two regions of the 
same country that are characterized by a different political and economic history.6 We analyze 
                                                
5 Bohnet et al. (2010) also study the role of reference points for trustworthiness on gain/loss utility from trusting 
behavior, by eliciting the minimum acceptable probability of trustworthiness that makes the subjects just willing to 
trust a stranger, and by comparing it with the minimum acceptable probability for an equivalent gamble. In contrast, 
we cannot compare directly the reference point for trusting and for gambling, but we estimate precisely the value of 
each parameter of the prospect theory. 
6 The North of Vietnam has a much longer communist history than the South since its establishment in 1945, while 
South Vietnam was under the French then the U.S. regime between 1945 and 1975. The two states were merged in 
1975 and unified politically as the socialist republic of Vietnam. Since 1986, the country has initiated 
market-oriented economic reforms. Therefore, the North followed a Soviet-style model of central planning for a 
long period (1954-1975) – whereas the South followed a market economy during that same period. Difference in the 
history of communism in the two regions could influence individual’s beliefs and expectations. Fox and Joiner 
(1964) conducted a survey in the South before the unification and observed animosity toward Northerners. By 1986, 
less than 6% of the farmers in the South participated in cooperatives, compared to 95 % in the North (Pingali and 
Xuan 1992, Xuan 1995). We expect that such differences in market exposure would relate to differences in trusting 
behavior between Northern and Southern participants in our study. 
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whether the effects of risk and time preferences on behavior in the trust game differ in the North 
and the South of Vietnam. The ability to compare different institutional settings in the same 
country gives our study a high degree of control compared to cross-country studies (like in 
Ockenfels and Weimann, 1998, or Brosig-Koch et al., 2011).7 Another strength of our study is 
that our participants come from villages with a wide range of average incomes. The use of 
detailed survey data to control the design (by stratifying samples) and to link survey results to 
experimental results is a rare feature for this kind of study.  
Our main findings show that trustors’ decisions are positively affected by the expectation of 
a higher return from the trustee. We do not find any effect of concavity of the utility function, 
loss aversion and present bias on the amount sent to the trustees. Yet, a higher time discounting 
increases this amount in the South sub-sample and probability weighting decreases it in the 
North sub-sample. Time discounting and loss aversion do not influence trustees’ behavior, but 
more risk averse and less present biased trustees return a higher share of their wealth to the 
trustor. Thus, using the approach of the prospect theory and of hyperbolic time discounting 
allows us to identify aspects of the relationships between trust and risk and time preferences that 
could not be uncovered by previous studies using the framework of the EU theory. Important 
regional differences are also found, with people in the North holding more pessimistic 
expectations on others’ trustworthiness and behaving less reciprocally than people in the South. 
                                                
7 The literature includes many cross-country comparisons on trust (Yamagishi et al., 1998; Carpenter et al., 2004; 
Ashraf et al., 2006; Bohnet et al. 2008; Bohnet et al., 2010), but within-country comparisons are relatively rare 
(Ockenfels and Weimann, 1998; Bahri and Wilson, 2004; Tanaka et al., 2010; Brosig-Koch et al., 2012; see also 
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007, on redistributive preferences). 
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These behavioral differences may result from long-lasting institutional differences and a longer 
market integration in the South, which may have favored norms of reciprocity. 
In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 describes the experimental design and procedures. 
Section 3 analyzes the results and Section 4 concludes.  
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
2.1 The three tasks 
In this experiment like in Tanaka et al. (2010) each session was comprised of three different 
decision-making tasks, performed in sequence: a risk elicitation task, a time preference 
elicitation task, and a trust game.8 Since our study focuses on trust, we present first the trust 
game before introducing the other tasks. All the instructions can be found in Appendix 1.  
The Trust game 
Our trust game is played under the strategy method.9 All the players act first as trustors 
(“player A”) and then as trustees (“player B”). Each player is initially endowed with KVND 
20.10 In the first stage, the trustor decides how much of his endowment to send (x) to the 
trustee, among the following choices: KVND 0, 5, 10, 15 and 20. This restricted number of 
options aims at simplifying the game. The amount sent is multiplied by three before it 
reaches the trustee to create positive externalities. Like in Eckel and Wilson (2004) and in 
                                                
8 We always ran the trust game at the end of the sessions because it is the most difficult game to play. Thus, we 
cannot control for order effects but we thought that it was more important to facilitate the subjects’ understanding. 
9 In their survey, Brandts and Charness (2011) show that in this type of games the strategy method produces similar 
behavior to the direct-response one. This is confirmed by the meta-analysis of Johnson and Mislin (2011a,b). 
10 VND refers to Vietnamese Dongs; K represents thousand. On average, the mean daily income for unskilled work 
in Vietnam in 2010 was around KVND 35 (around 2 U.S. Dollars). Both players receive the same endowment so 
that they are ex ante equal in terms of experimental wealth. 
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Ashraf et al. (2006), we ask the trustor to report how much return he expects from the trustee 
conditional on the amount he sent to him, as we expect that part of trust is calculative (Hardin, 
2002). For simplicity and to avoid hedging, we do not incentivize belief elicitation.  
In the second stage, all players act as trustees and have to decide how much they are 
willing to return to the trustor (y) for each possible amount sent by the trustor. We keep 
constant the order in which subjects made decisions for facilitating their understanding. Like 
in Buchan et al. (2006) the trustees can return any share of their total wealth (i.e. the tripled 
amount received from the trustor plus the endowment) to the trustor. This is different from 
the standard trust game of Berg et al. (1995) in which trustees can only send back a share of 
the amount received from the trustor. From a theoretical perspective, however, the two 
designs deliver the same predictions regarding both the trustee’s and trustor’s behavior (see 
Appendix 2). In order to facilitate the calculation of payoffs, participants are given tables 
with examples for each possible amount sent.  
Before the game starts, each participant is given randomly a tag colored either red or white. 
At the end of the game once all players have made their decisions in both roles, we toss a coin. If 
head comes up, the participants with red tags are assigned the role of the trustor and those with 
white tags the role of the trustee. We pair players randomly and we implement the players’ 
actual decisions corresponding to their role. The final payoff of the trustor is (20 – x+y) and that 
of the trustee is (20+ 3*x-y).  
Elicitation of risk preferences 
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To measure the three parameters that characterize risk attitudes in the prospect theory (utility 
concavity, probability weighting, and loss aversion), we ask participants to make decisions in 
three series of paired lotteries including respectively 12, 14 and seven questions (see Appendix 
1). Each question is a choice between two binary lotteries, A or B. Each decision is made by 
choosing a reward with a certain probability represented by a number of balls, with each ball 
marked by a number from 1 to 10. In the first series, plan A is fixed at KVND 40 with 
probability 0.3 and KVND 10 with probability 0.7. Plan B is half fixed and half changing. The 
payoff is always KVND 5 with probability 0.9 and, as one moves down the rows, the payoff is 
from KVND 68 to KVND 600 with probability 0.1. Series 2 is similar, but with different payoffs 
and probabilities. Plan A is always fixed, at KVND 40 with probability 0.9 and KVND 30 with 
probability 0.1. In plan B the payoff is KVND 5 with probability 0.3 and, moving down the rows, 
from KVND 54 to 130 with probability 0.7. In series 1 and 2, individuals are expected to choose 
plan A in the first row, and as the high potential payoff increases in plan B down the rows, to 
switch to preferring B to A. A risk-averse person should switch later than a risk-neutral one. 
To address loss aversion, series 3 involves both gains and losses in both plan A and plan B. 
In either plan the probabilities of gains and losses are the same: 0.5. The differences between 
plan A and plan B lie in two points. First, in plan B, the gains and losses are all much larger than 
in plan A. Second, in plan B, gains are always KVND 30, while the amount that can be lost 
decreases from KVND 21 to 11, as one moves down the rows. In plan A, the amount of gains 
decreases and the amount of losses increases across rows, with the gains varying from KVND 5 
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to 1 and the losses varying from KVND 4 to 8. The later they switch from A to B, the more 
averse individuals are to losses. 
In all three series, we enforce monotonic switching by asking participants at which question 
they would “switch” from plan A to plan B. They can switch starting with the first question and 
it is made clear in the instructions that they do not have to switch at all if they do not want to. 
After they completed the three series of questions, a participant is selected to draw a numbered 
ball from a bingo cage with 33 numbered balls, to determine which row of choice will be played 
for real money. Then, we put 10 balls in the cage. Another participant selected as before draws 
one ball randomly to determine the outcome of the lottery.  
We use cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and the one-parameter 
form of Prelec’s axiomatically-derived weighting function (1998). U(x, p; y, q) represents the 
expected prospect value over binary prospects consisting of outcome x with probability p and 
outcome y with probability q. Given this setup, we define the prospect theory utility as follows: 
     (1) 
     (2) 
           (3) 
where v(x) denotes the power value function, with 
 v x( ) = x!  for  x ! 0                      (4) 
 
! x( ) = "# "x$( ) for x < 0                      (5) 
w(p) = exp ! ! ln p( )"#$ %&                        (6) 
 U (x, p; y,q) = w
+ ( p + q)v(x) + w+ (q)(v( y) − v(x)) if 0 < x < y
 U (x, p; y,q) = w
− ( p + q)v(x) + w(q)− (v( y) − v(x)) if y < x < 0 
 U (x, p; y,q) = w
− ( p)v(x) + w+ (q)(v( y) if x < 0 < y
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σ represents the concavity of the power value function and indicates increasing or 
decreasing marginal value of money. In the domain of gains, an individual is considered as 
risk-neutral if σ=1, risk averse if σ>1 and risk lover if σ<1. λ represents the degree of loss 
aversion, with higher values of λ associated with higher loss aversion. The probability weighting 
function is linear if α =1 (as in the EU theory). If α > 1, the weighting function is S-shaped (the 
individual underweights small probabilities and overweighs large probabilities). If α < 1, it is 
inverted S-shaped (the individual overweighs small probabilities and underweights large 
probabilities). We use Prelec’s weighting function because it is flexible enough to accommodate 
the cases where individuals have either inverted-S or S-shaped weighting functions, and has fit 
previous data reasonably well. If α = 1 and λ =1, the EU theory is not rejected. 
Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix 3 present the predicted values of the parameters for the 
curvature of the utility function (σ) and for the probability sensitivity in Prelec’s weighting 
function (α) for all possible combinations of switching points in series 1 and 2.11 Similarly 
Table A3 in Appendix 3 presents the estimates of the ranges of the loss aversion parameter, λ, 
for three possible values of σ (0.2, 0.6 and 1).  
Elicitation of time preferences 
To measure the quasi-hyperbolic discounting parameters that characterize time preferences (time 
discounting and present bias), we ask participants to make 75 decisions between receiving 
money either tomorrow or at specified times in the future (see Appendix 1). Each question is a 
                                                
11 Suppose a participant switched from plan A to plan B at the second question in series 1 and third question in 
series 2. The lower and higher bounds for σ are (1.16, 1.29), and the lower and upper bounds for α are (0.56, 0.64). 
The mean values of lower and upper bounds indicate that the value of (σ, α) for this participant is (1.2, 0.6). 
	   13 
choice between plan A that offers smaller rewards tomorrow (“Receive VND x tomorrow”) and 
plan B that offers larger rewards some time in the future (“Receive VND y in t days”). We use 
15 combinations of y and t that define 15 types of plan B. For each (y, t) combination, x 
increases as rows move on, equaling to 1/6, 1/3, 1/2, 2/3, and 5/6 of the value of y. In other 
words, in each type of plan B, plan A changes with an increasing payoff across five choices. The 
rewards x and y vary between KVND 5 and 250 and between KVND 30 and 300, respectively. 
The time delay t varies from three days to three months. In plan A the payment date is tomorrow 
so that regardless of the plan, the participants have to come back to receive their earnings. The 
earlier switchers from B to A are less patient. Our design is therefore different from Tanaka et 
al.’s (2010) in which the early date is today. If participants have any doubt about the certainty of 
future payoffs, they may prefer plan A not because they are impatient but because they do not 
trust the experimenters on receiving money in the future or because they want to minimize 
transaction costs. In our design, no payment for this task can be made immediately and only the 
time lag between the two options can vary. Therefore, the preference for either the early or the 
later payment should only reveal inter-temporal preferences. 
In all 15 sets of five questions, we enforce monotonic switching by asking participants at 
which question they would “switch” from plan B to plan A. After all participants completed the 
75 questions, we put 75 balls in a bingo cage and one ball is randomly drawn by a participant to 
select a question that will determine how much money they earned and when this money would 
be delivered. We then ask the participants to discuss about to whom the money should be 
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entrusted until they pick it up on the delivered date (village heads, commune officers, etc.). For 
each participant, we put the money they earned in an envelope and wrote down their name, the 
amount they should receive, and the date they should pick it up from the entrusted person. The 
entrusted person would keep all the envelopes until the pick-up date. 
These pairwise choices permit estimation of the three-factor model developed by Benhabib 
et al. (2010). The model values a reward of y at time t according to yD(y,t) where  
yD(y,t)=y                         if t=0        (7) 
yD(y,t)= 
 
! 1" 1"#( )rt( )
1
1"# y           if t>0  (8) 
The three factors r, β and θ separate conventional time discounting (r), present-bias (β) 
and hyperbolicity (θ) of the discount function D(y,t).12 Tanaka et al., (2010) show that 
including all behavioral parameters does not improve the model fitness significantly. For the 
purpose of this study, we assume θ equal to 1 and estimate β. Our model specification for time 
preferences is thus based on the quasi-hyperbolic discounting framework. A higher value of β 
means that the individual is less present biased. 
2.2. Conjectures 
Conjecture 1: Both risk aversion (σ>1) and loss aversion (higher λ) affect negatively the amount 
transferred to the trustee because there is a probability that some trustees keep the money 
                                                
12 Andersen et al. (2008) and Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) have pointed out that the estimates of time preferences 
can be biased if one assumes risk neutrality. Using the same data as Tanaka et al. (2010), Nguyen (2011) has 
applied a structural approach to jointly estimate risk and time preferences parameters. These estimates were very 
similar to those in Tanaka et al. (2010). Given this finding, we apply here the same estimation method as Tanaka et 
al. (2010). We have however reestimated our parameters using the Maximum Simulated Likelihood approach. We 
found that only the discount rate and the loss aversion parameters in the South were (weakly) significantly different 
between the two estimation methods. 
	   15 
transferred for themselves. There is no conjecture as regards the link between the shape of the 
probability weighting function (given byα) and trust. 
Conjecture 2: The proportion of total wealth returned by the trustee could be reduced by loss 
aversion, since it represents a loss for the trustee if the reference point is the money he has 
received from the trustor. It should be affected neither by risk aversion nor by the shape of the 
probability weighting function since there is no uncertainty associated with the return decision.  
Conjecture 3: Patience (measured by a lower discount rate r and lower present bias, i.e. a higher 
value ofβ) affects positively the amount transferred by the trustor if we assume that long-term 
planning and lower impulsiveness are more likely to support the social norm of cooperation. 
Conjecture 4: Patience increases the proportion returned by the trustee since not keeping the 
amount received for one’s own benefit requires self-control and future orientation.  
2.3. Experimental procedures 
We conducted our field experiment in eight villages in Vietnam: four villages of two provinces 
in the North and four villages of two provinces in the South.13 We collected data from 166 
participants in total, 87 participants in the North and 79 participants in the South.14 A typical lab 
in the field experiment as ours may potentially face two types of selection biases: the selection of 
households and the selection of family members as participants in our experiment. To limit the 
                                                
13 In the North (Red River Delta), the villages are Yen Lac Truang and Yen Lac Lienchau in Vinh Phuc province 
and Thai Hoa and Diem Dien in Thai Binh province. In the South (Mekong Delta), the villages are Thot Not and Co 
Do Trung in Can Tho province and TraVinh Thanh and Phuoc Hao in TraVinh province. These villages are 
different from those surveyed by Tanaka et al. (2010). We ran one session in each village to avoid contamination 
effects. 
14 One commune in the North and one in the South had an odd number of observations. In these two communes we 
asked a research assistant to participate in the trust game so that all participants could be paired. Of course, we do 
not include the data from the research assistants in the analysis. 
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first source of bias, we invited members of all the households who were interviewed during the 
2002 Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS 2002). Research coordinators from 
the Vietnam Institute of Economics helped in contacting local government officials, and asked 
them to invite the head of each of the 25 households that were involved in the 2002 survey to 
participate in our experiment. The participation rate was high since 21 individuals participated in 
each village. The average missing households did not participate mainly because of their 
relocations to other places.  
As regards the second source of bias, we acknowledge that we have no control on how the 
individual was selected within each household. We compare statistics on age, gender, education, 
and income of actual participants and invited participants. We find that in the South, the actual 
participants differ significantly from the invited participants in terms of education and age 
(invited participants are younger and more educated). In the North the actual participants differ 
significantly from the invited participants as regards their gender composition (the actual 
participants include more females). Reassuringly, there is no evidence of selection bias in terms 
of the household’s income (precise statistics are available upon request).  
The experimental sessions started at 8 a.m. and lasted about three hours including payment 
and the post-experimental demographic survey. Participants were given instructions including a 
description of the game, examples, and record sheets with a series of questions to be answered 
for each game. Illiterate subjects (3%) were given oral instructions. Participants who had 
difficulty completing record sheets by themselves were also helped by assistants. On average, 
	   17 
participants earned KVND 120 (about $7), roughly 3-4 days’ wage for casual unskilled labor. 
They were paid in private in a separate room. 
2.4. Pool of participants 
Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics by region. The characteristics in the first panel are those 
reported by the participants and those in the second panel were elicited during the experiment.  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
According to Mann-Whitney tests in which each individual is an independent observation, 
the participants from the North are slightly older and more educated on average than those from 
the South. Proportion tests indicate that the share of females is higher. The proportions of 
participants holding an occupation in agriculture and having a secondary job are fairly balanced 
in the two regions. While participants are more loss averse in the North than in the South, time 
preferences do not differ significantly across regions. 
The probability weighting parameter (α) is significantly smaller than 1 and the loss 
aversion parameter (λ) is significantly greater than 1 in both regions (t-tests, p<0.001). This 
finding rejects the EU function and shows that utility is better described by an inverted S-shaped 
utility function (they overweight small probabilities and underweight large ones) and by loss 
aversion. The mean estimated values of (α,σ) are (0.633, 0.553) for the North and (0.645, 
0.569) for the South.15 These values are close to those estimated by Tanaka et al. (2010) for the 
                                                
15 OLS estimates of the curvature of the utility function against individual characteristics show that participants 
with a higher income are more risk seeking (σ is lower) and, controlling for absolute income, those who have a 
higher relative income are more risk averse. In the South only, older participants are more risk averse but this 
relationship is not linear. In the North only, higher education is associated with a higher risk aversion. The 
regression of risk parameters against demographic variables is available upon request.  
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North (0.74, 0.59) and the South (0.74, 0.63) of Vietnam, and to those found by Liu (2012) with 
the same method for farmers in China (0.69, 0.48). Our estimation of λ is 3.542 in the North 
and 2.676 in the South (they were 2.63 in Tanaka et al., 2010; 3.47 in Liu, 2012).16 
Regarding time preferences, the mean values of the time discounting rate (r) and of the 
present bias parameter (β) are 0.005 and 0.610, respectively, in the North and 0.003 and 0.560, 
respectively, in the South.17 In Tanaka et al. (2010), the estimates were 0.008 for r and 0.644 for 
β, showing that our participants are more present biased. In our estimates, β is significantly 
different from 1 in both regions (p<0.001), which tends to reject the exponential discounting 
model and supports the quasi-hyperbolic discounting approach. 
3. RESULTS 
We now turn to analyzing the results from the trust game. We first show summary statistics. 
Then, we explore the determinants of trust and trustworthiness by means of a regression 
analysis. 
3.1. Summary statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics by region. We first consider the mean amount sent by the 
trustors. Trustees’ trustworthiness is captured by the mean proportion of total wealth returned by 
the trustees conditional on each amount possibly sent by the trustor. Table 2 also mentions the 
                                                
16 Regression results for loss aversion show that older participants are less loss averse but the relationship is 
U-shaped. Richer participants are more loss averse, but a higher relative income reduces loss aversion. 
17 Regression results for discount rate and present bias conclude that females are marginally less patient than males 
(r is higher) and participants who hold a second job are less present biased (β is higher). In the South, we found 
that females and older participants are more present biased but this relationship is non linear; richer participants are 
also more present biased but having a higher relative income decreases the present bias.   
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mean return expected by the trustors and the percentage of trustees who return more than the 
tripled amount sent by the trustor. Figure 1 displays the expectations of the trustors depending on 
the amount they send to the trustee, by region (excluding the two participants who send nothing). 
Table 2 shows that the mean amount sent by the trustors is KVND 9.85, which represents 
49.25% of the initial endowment. Trustors transfer 47.15% of their endowment in the North and 
51.60% in the South but the difference is not statistically significant. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test concludes that the distribution of transfers does not differ across regions. Overall, the 
senders’ behavior in both regions is comparable with other studies.18 
(Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 about here) 
The amount sent is motivated in part by the expectation of reciprocity. Figure 1 shows that 
higher transfers are associated with higher expectations of return in absolute terms. Interestingly, 
trustors in the North expect on average lower returns from their counterpart (14.04) than trustors 
in the South (19.61, p=0.004), except those who send all their endowment. This indicates that 
individuals behave similarly in the North and in the South although the formers are less 
confident on the return of their transfer. 
Regarding trustees’ behavior, the Nash equilibrium of a null return is almost never played 
                                                
18 In a meta-analysis of the trust game, Johnson and Mislin (2011a,b) show that, on average, trustors send 50.88% 
of their endowment although variations across studies are large. This proportion is 51.60% in Berg et al. (1995) and 
49.50% in the American subjects sample in the impersonal communication treatment of Buchan et al. (2006). We 
are aware that higher stakes tend to reduce trust. In our case, KVND 20 represent between half-a-day’s and a full 
day’s wage. For a stake of a full day’s wage in Russia, Bahry and Wilson (2004) found that 62% of the subjects 
send at least 50% of their endowment. We found 61.45% in our sample. Studying trust with a public goods game, 
Carpenter et al. (2004) found that Vietnamese were more trusting than Thais, but the result may be driven by the 
possibility to sanction deviations from the norm. Comparing American students and recent immigrants from 
Vietnam, Parks and Vu (1994) found that Vietnamese were more cooperative in public goods games. 
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(one observation when the transfer is 5 or 10 and three observations when it is 15). Trustees 
return on average 31.81% of their wealth to the trustor (S.D.=12.97).19 The mean percentage 
returned is significantly higher in the South (37.20, S.D.=14.58) than in the North (26.91, 
S.D.=8.89) (p<0.001), for any amount sent by the trustor. The standard deviation of the 
percentage returned for each amount sent is smaller in the North than in the South. This is 
consistent with the idea that market integration – that started earlier in the South - tends to foster 
norms that lead to more reciprocity. However, simple comparisons should be taken with care 
since the two samples present differences in terms of participants’ characteristics. 
The absolute amount returned to the trustor increases in the amount potentially received, 
confirming that trustees are willing to return the trust expressed by the trustors. However, the 
amount returned represents a stable percentage of the total wealth as the amount received from 
the trustor increases. The only significant difference is when the trustor sends 10 compared to 5 
(Wilcoxon test, p=0.003). Most people do not try to equalize payoffs, which would require that 
the trustee sends back two thirds of the tripled amount received, i.e. an increasing proportion of 
total wealth. Many players reciprocate but they also exploit to some extent the trustors. Table 2 
also indicates that a small fraction of the trustees send more than the amount received when 
transfers are low, increasing inequality at the benefit of the other player. This suggests that a low 
transfer is not necessarily interpreted as a lack of trust and that some trustees express 
unconditional other-regarding preferences, consistent with Cox (2004) and Ashraf et al. (2006). 
                                                
19 Surveying 75 studies, Johnson and Mislin (2011b) find a mean rate of return of 36.51% of the tripled amount 
received, which simply compensates -on average- trustors. In Buchan et al. (2006), the mean rate of return was is 37% 
and 11% of the trustees returned nothing.   
	   21 
To investigate further the determinants of behavior, we proceed now to an econometric analysis. 
3.2. Econometric analysis 
Our empirical exercise is based on the following model specification: 
 Y = f (! , X )+ "  
where Y represents trust or trustworthiness; θ is the vector of risk and time preferences parameter; 
X is a vector of demographic variables; and! is the standard error term. 
Trustor’s behavior 
Table 3 reports the results of regressions in which the dependent variable is the amount sent by 
the trustors. Since this variable takes categorical values (0, 5, 10, 15 or 20), we estimate ordered 
probit models on the whole sample (models (1) and (2)), the North sub-sample (model (3)) and 
the South sub-sample (model (4)). Except in model (1), we always include village fixed effects 
in the estimations to control notably for possible different levels of development. The 
independent variables include the expectation of the individual regarding the amount returned by 
the trustee since we expect that the amount sent is partly motivated by the expectation of 
reciprocity. The models also account for the estimated parameters for risk attitudes (probability 
weighting, α, risk aversion, σ, and loss aversion, λ) and for time preferences (time 
discounting rate, r, and present bias, β).20 We control for the number of acquaintances in the 
session since individuals may be more trustful with their anonymous counterpart if it is more 
                                                
20 λ is the midpoint of the lower bound and upper bound of the switching point in questions of series 3 in game 1 
and it takes different values when risk aversion (σ) differs. In all the regression analysis reported in this paper, we 
use the values of λ corresponding to σ=1. Tanaka et al. (2010) show that the choice of σ would have no effect on the 
estimation of λ. That said, we also estimated all our models with a value of λ given by σ=0.2 and by σ=0.6 (not 
reported here but available upon request). The results are not affected.  
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likely that they know him personally (see the importance of the target in trust games in McEvily 
et al., 2012, or of social distance in Song et al., 2012). We control for demographic variables 
(age and age squared, gender, and years of education), the occupational status (first job being in 
agriculture, holding a second job) and both absolute and relative income.21,22 Table A4 in 
Appendix 4 complements this analysis by reporting OLS estimates of the determinants of the 
expected return as the dependent variable, including the same independent variables as in Table 
3. These beliefs should not be affected by efficiency concerns or altruism; thus, combined with 
the decision regarding the amount to send, they allow us to better characterize the trust of the 
senders. Models (1) and (2) consider the whole sample without and with village fixed effects, 
model (2) the North sub-sample and model (3) the South sub-sample.23 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
Table 3 indicates that the senders’ behavior is highly significantly influenced by the 
expected return from the trustees: the more people expect to receive in return, the more they trust 
and the more they send to others. Note that the amount sent may not only capture trust but also 
                                                
21 Financial data come from the VHLSS 2002. Total income has been reconstituted by adding all the sources of 
income of the households as detailed in the survey. Since the experiment was already more than three hours long, it 
would have been difficult to collect truthful additional information on the various financial resources at the end of 
the sessions. Relative income measures the household’s relative status in the village. It is calculated as the ratio of 
each household’s income to the mean income of the participants from the same village.  
22 Total income may be endogenous as it may influence trust but it may also be determined by the ability to trust 
others. For that reason, we have reestimated these models using rainfalls at the time and location of the 2002 survey 
as an exogenous instrument for income. Indeed, weather is likely to influence income, as most participants hold jobs 
related to agriculture, but it has no reason to correlate with trust. In the first stage, we have estimated the correlation 
between income and rainfalls, which is significant at the one percent level, to calculate a predicted value of income. 
In the second stage, we have estimated ordered probit models including the predicted value of income among the 
independent variables. Since the results are qualitatively unchanged, we do not report these regressions. 
23 We also tested an IV 2SLS model, instrumenting income with the rainfalls. Results are qualitatively similar to 
those reported in Table A4 and therefore, we do not report them here. 
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altruism.24 The amount sent above the expected return probably captures some other-regarding 
preferences. But since we have no independent measure of individuals’ degree of altruism, we 
cannot isolate trust.  
We also note that there is no significant difference between the North and the South. 
However, a test comparing the coefficients associated with the expected return in the two 
regions indicates that for a given level of expectations, people in the North send significantly 
more (p=0.046) although they hold lower expectations compared to people in the South (Table 
A4).  
The second important result is that when we pool all the data together (models (1) and (2)) 
neither risk preferences nor time preferences have a significant influence on the amount sent 
(Table 3) or on the expectations of return (Table A4), tending to confirm the findings of Eckel 
and Wilson (2004), Ashraf et al. (2006), Houser et al. (2006), and McEvily et al. (2012). 
However, if we reestimate model (1) without including the expected return variable (available 
upon request), we find that the loss aversion parameter becomes significant at the 10% level 
(p=0.082) (but significance vanishes when village dummies are included in model (2)). The fact 
that loss aversion is marginally significant when we do not control for expectations but loses 
significance when we control for them suggests that loss aversion is mainly related to the trust 
                                                
24 Indeed, trustors can send money because of other social preferences such as joint welfare or altruism and not only 
because they trust others. In particular, Carter and Castillo (2003), Cox (2004) and Ashraf et al. (2006) have shown 
that this game also captures other-regarding preferences. By manipulating receiver’s endowments, Brülhart and 
Usunier (2012) have found, however, that trust is the dominant motivation for senders in this game. Eliciting beliefs 
also shows that expectations about the return play also a major role in the sending decision (Chaudhuri and 
Gangadharan, 2007).  
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component of the sending decision. This effect is driven by the sample from the North. Indeed, 
when we omit the expected return variable from model (3), in the North more loss averse 
subjects are less likely to trust others, which is consistent with the fact that trust involves a risk 
of loss if the second player betrays (p=0.039 without village fixed effects and p=0.092 with fixed 
effects). Table 3 also indicates that probability weighting has a borderline significant negative 
effect on the amount sent in the North (model (3)), while a higher discounting rate increases this 
amount in the South (model (4)). This positive effect of long-term impatience in the South is 
surprising.  
A few other individual characteristics matter. Model (1) shows a borderline significant 
inverted U-shaped relationship between age and the amount sent that is not influenced by 
differences in expectations related to age (see Table A4). This result is consistent with previous 
findings (Carpenter et al., 2004; Sutter and Kocher, 2007; Bellemare and Kröger, 2007). But it is 
fragile as it vanishes when we include village fixed effects (model (2)). More educated 
participants tend to be less trustful (as in Schechter, 2007, and McEvily et al., 2012) although 
higher education is not correlated with lower expectations. Controlling for income, holding a 
second job greatly increases the amount sent. This result is driven by the South sub-sample. We 
do not find any direct effect of the level of income, in contrast with Bellemare and Kröger 
(2007). We find no effect of gender (similarly to Croson and Buchan, 1999; Ashraf et al. 2006; 
Cox and Deck, 2006), although females expect lower returns than males especially in the North 
(see Table A4), which may suggest that females’ decisions are more driven by social preferences 
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than by the expectation of reciprocity. In a survey on 20 studies of the trust game, Croson and 
Gneezy (2009) find that gender is reported to influence trust in 12 of them.  
We summarize our main results on the trustors’ behavior as follows: 
Result 1: The amounts sent by the trustors are partly driven by the expectation of return from the 
trustee. People in the North do not send less than people in the South although they are more 
pessimistic in terms of expected returns than people in the South. 
Result 2: Contrary to Conjectures 1 and 3, risk aversion and present bias do not influence the 
amount sent in general. Supporting Conjecture 1, loss aversion decreases the amount sent in the 
North sub-sample (but only if we omit the expected return), and probability weighting has the 
same directional effect. Higher time discounting increases trust in the South sub-sample.. 
 
Trustees’ behavior 
Table 4 displays the results of OLS estimates in which the dependent variable is the percentage 
of total wealth (three times the potential amount sent by the trustor plus the endowment) that is 
sent back by the trustee to the trustor.25 Since each trustee’s decision is observed four times 
(when the sender sends him 5, 10, 15 and 20),26 robust standard errors are clustered at the 
individual level and we include village fixed effects except in model (1). Like in previous studies, 
we only consider the cases in which the sender has sent a positive amount. In all regressions, the 
set of independent variables is the same as in Table 3, except that we include a variable 
indicating the amount potentially sent by the trustor (that takes values 5, 10, 15 or 20) and we 
exclude the expected return.  
                                                
25 Since we have only ten censored observations out of 576, Tobit models are not required. We also estimated an 
IV-2SLS model in which rainfalls instrument total income. Most results are qualitatively unaffected. 
26 Except 23 participants who were observed only three times because of a mistake in registering the amount 
returned in one village when receiving KVND 15. Note that we have reestimated the models reported in Table 3 
with only 133 participants. The results are unaffected. 
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(Insert Table 4 about here) 
While additional regressions (available upon request) show that the amount returned to the 
trustors increases in the level of trust, models (1) and (2) in Table 4 shows that the proportion 
returned is independent on the amount received (consistent with Berg et al. (1995) in the absence 
of social history, and with Barr (2003)). This hides in fact two opposite behaviors according to 
the region. Indeed, the amount sent by the trustor has a non-significant but negative influence on 
the proportion of wealth returned in the North (model (3), p=0.112), while it has a significant 
positive influence in the South (model (4)). We have also checked with separate regressions that 
for each given amount sent, the proportion returned is significantly higher in the South than in 
the North. Holm and Danielson (2005) also found in Tanzania a negative relationship between 
the amount sent and the amount returned. They attribute this finding to the fact that - given a 
share of the amount received - higher proportion of the endowment sent by the trustor makes it 
more expensive for the trustee to return.  
Overall, these findings indicate that people in the South are more reciprocal than in the 
North, consistent with Tanaka et al. (2013) in which trustors and trustees had to make 
choices conditional on the income level of the player they were matched with. A closer 
examination of our data cannot explain this difference by the use of different heuristics in the 
two regions (e.g. returning a fixed percentage of wealth, for example the midpoint of the 
range). We investigated whether the regional difference could be driven by differences in 
expectations about others’ trustworthiness when subjects play the role of a trustor. In 
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additional regressions (available upon request) we find that the higher is the expectation of 
return when in the role of a trustor, the more people return when in the role of a trustee, but 
this relationship is significant only in the North (p=0.007). This suggests that the difference 
in returning behavior is driven partly by the fact that in the North, only those who have 
higher expectations on others’ reciprocity return a higher proportion themselves. Further 
research is needed to explore whether this difference may result from a longer exposure of 
populations to collectivist organizations in the North –especially for more educated people- 
and a longer exposure to market economy in the South, which may have developed different 
norms or a different knowledge of what shared norms of fairness are. Indeed, it has been 
shown in particular that market integration is associated with increased levels of fairness and 
generosity (Esminger and Henrich, 2014).27 
The proportion returned is not affected by loss aversion. Somewhat surprisingly since the 
return decision does not involve any risk, the three regressions of Table 4 indicate that the 
proportion returned increases significantly (except in the North) in the concavity of the utility 
function (σ). Eckel and Wilson (2004) have also arrived at the same finding. Additional separate 
regressions by level of trust show that risk aversion significantly increases the proportion 
                                                
27 Uslaner (2008) and Brosig-Koch et al. (2012) suggest that a communist regime impacts cooperation negatively. 
Its effects on trust and redistributive preferences seem durable (Rainer and Siedler, 2009, Alesina and 
Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007, on Germany after reunification); see also Ockenfels and Weimann, 1998, on solidarity in 
Eastern and Western Germany. Voors et al. (2012) show that historical events such as wars have long-term effects 
on social and individual preferences. Ensminger (2001) finds with dictator games played in Kenya that market 
experience teaches fairness. Johnson and Mislin (2011b) mention that the greater is market integration, the more 
people learn signals on how others expect them to behave in social interactions. Competitive markets favor the 
formation of shared norms. Note, however, that we find no significant effect of subjects’ age which could capture 
the length of exposure to collectivism or to market economy. 
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returned when the amount sent was either 5 or 10, whereas it has no significant influence for 
higher levels of trust. A possible interpretation is that although our game setting is anonymous, 
anxiety about the fact that not reciprocating could be considered as unfair (because breaking a 
social norm) is more pregnant when the decision is more difficult, i.e. when the trustor has sent a 
smaller amount (indeed, the decision is easier for a pro-social trustee to return a high amount to a 
trustor who behaved trustfully, but it requires more deliberation when the trustor has sent a small 
amount). This interpretation assumes that the risk aversion parameter captures not only anxiety 
in the monetary domain but also in the social domain. 
While the proportion returned never depends on long-run patience – the r parameter – it 
increases significantly and greatly with the short-run patience i.e., the β parameter (this effect is 
driven by the South sample). This finding is expected considering that more present biased 
individuals are more willing to trade off a short-run benefit for long-run costs in general. On the 
opposite, less impulsive people may be more used to forego an immediate benefit in exchange 
for a long-run benefit in their real life.28  
Finally, models (1) to (3) shows that in the North more educated individuals and females 
return a lower proportion of their wealth compared to less educated individuals and males. Barr 
(2003) and Schechter (2007) also found a negative relationship between gender and 
trustworthiness and suggest that in rural villages, women are less used to get access to money on 
                                                
28 To test whether people behave in the experiment as they behave in their real life, we asked the following question 
in the post-experiment survey: “Generally speaking, would you say that people in your village can be trusted or that 
you can’t be too careful?” A binary trust variable was created. However, we did not find any correlation between 
this variable and patience or between this variable and the proportion returned. Holm and Danielson (2005) also 
found that in Tanzania answers to survey trust questions did not correlate with behavior in the trust game. 
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their own and are therefore less willing to give it up. In the North holding a job in agriculture has 
also a negative impact on the proportion returned. The number of acquaintances, absolute and 
relative incomes, and age do not significantly influence the proportion returned. This contrasts 
with studies conducted in Europe in which older people are trustworthier than younger ones 
(Sutter and Kocher, 2007; Bellemare and Kröger, 2007).  
Our main findings regarding the trustees’ behavior can be summarized as follows: 
Result 3: The proportion of total wealth returned by the trustees to the trustor tends to decrease 
with the amount sent by the trustor in the North, while it increases in the South, suggesting that 
people in the North act less reciprocally.  
Result 4: In contrast to Conjecture 2, risk aversion increases the proportion of wealth returned to 
the trustor but loss aversion has no effect. Supporting Conjecture 4, less present biased trustees 
return a higher proportion of their wealth to the trustor; however time discounting has no 
influence. 
4. CONCLUSION 
We have investigated the impact of risk attitudes and time preferences on trust and 
trustworthiness by conducting an artefactual field experiment in the North and in the South of 
Vietnam. While previous studies have explored the links between risk attitudes and trust in the 
framework of the expected utility theory without delivering a consensual response, the novel 
contribution of this paper is adopting a richer perspective permitted by the use of both the 
prospect theory and non-standard theories of inter-temporal preferences.  
Our analysis shows that the amount sent by the trustors is not affected by the concavity of 
the utility function, loss aversion, or present bias. These results complement those of Eckel and 
Wilson (2004), Ashraf et al. (2006), Houser et al. (2010), and McEvily et al. (2012). However, 
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we also found that a higher time discounting increases the amount sent in the South while 
probability weighting decreases it in the North. This suggests that without contradicting the 
standard approach, the richer perspective permitted by the prospect theory and the hyperbolic 
time preferences approach gives a more precise picture of the role of risk attitudes and time 
preferences on trusting behavior. 
While time discounting and loss aversion do not influence trustworthiness, more risk averse 
and less present biased trustees return a higher share of their wealth to the trustor. An 
interpretation is that in real settings individuals know that not reciprocating others’ trust entails a 
risk of social sanctions. Since the returning decision does not involve any monetary risk, our 
measure of risk attitudes may possibly also capture some aspects of social risks. Less present 
biased individuals (those who are more future oriented) are trustworthier possibly because in real 
settings they are more aware that a short-run benefit may be detrimental to long-run interactions. 
Finally, our results show evidence of important regional differences in social preferences, 
with people in the North of Vietnam holding lower expectations about others’ reciprocity and 
behaving less reciprocally than people in the South. These differences in behavior may be 
related to differences in the history of communism between the two regions and a longer market 
integration in the South that may have favored norms of fairness. Even many years after political 
reunification regional specificities persist. Our findings are very consistent with those studies on 
Germany, showing that East Germans who have been exposed to communist institutions showed 
less trust and less solidarity even long after reunification (Ockenfels and Weimann, 1998; Rainer 
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and Siedler, 2009; Brosig-Koch et al., 2011). Further investigations are needed to explore how 
long political institutions and norms shape preferences and expectations even after having been 
replaced by others.  
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TABLES  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of participants by region 
 North South Total 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Characteristics reported by the participants     
Age 
Female 
Years of education 
First job in agriculture 
Holding a second job 
Total income 
53.15 
0.57 
8.47 
0.70 
0.44 
42.37 
11.77 
0.50 
4.59 
0.46 
0.50 
51.61 
47.28*** 
0.32*** 
7.15** 
0.62 
0.38 
34.95 
9.94 
0.47 
3.62 
0.49 
0.49 
28.17 
50 
0.45 
7.8 
0.66 
0.41 
38.73 
11.30 
0.50 
4.19 
0.47 
0.49 
41.83 
Characteristics elicited in the experiment     
Probability weighting (α) 
Risk aversion (σ) 
Loss aversion (λ) 
Time discounting rate (r) 
Present bias (β) 
0.633 
0.553 
3.542 
0.005 
0.610 
0.206 
0.275 
3.242 
0.014 
0.610 
0.645 
0.569 
2.676** 
0.003 
0.560 
0.241 
0.274 
3.056 
0.012 
0.560 
0.638 
0.561 
3.130 
0.004 
0.586 
0.223 
0.274 
3.175 
0.013 
0.161 
Number of participants 87 79 166 
 
Notes: S.D. for standard deviation. *** indicate significance at the 1% level and ** at the 5% level of either 
Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests or proportion tests comparing the sample from the North and the sample from the 
South. λ is the midpoint of the lower and upper bounds of the switching point in questions of series 3 in game 1 
and it takes different values when risk aversion (σ) differs. Here, we used the values of λ corresponding to σ=1. 
The estimated value of λ would gain much the same result using different values of the risk aversion parameter 
(see Tanaka et al., 2010, p. 560). The level of significance of the comparison between North and South is not 
affected when taking other values of σ.  
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Table 2. Summary statistics on decisions, by region 
 
Notes: The samples include 87 observations for the North and 79 for the South. However, due to mistakes in 
recording data, 25 observations are missing for the return of trustees in case the trustor has sent 15 (one village with 
24 observations in the North and one observation in the South). Amounts are expressed in KVND. p-values are from 
two sample Mann-Whitney rank sum tests comparing the North and South samples. An exception isa that 
corresponds to a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions for all possible amounts sent. 
 
 
  
 All North South p-values 
Mean amount sent by trustors 
% trustors sending 0 
      - sending 5 
      - sending 10 
      - sending 15 
      - sending 20 
9.85 (5.12) 
1.20 
37.35 
37.35 
11.45 
12.65 
9.43 (4.91) 
1.15 
39.08 
41.38 
6.90 
11.49 
10.32 (5.33) 
1.27 
35.44 
32.91 
16.46 
13.92 
0.289 
 
 
0.539a 
Mean expected return  16.69 (10.99) 14.05 (8.63) 19.61 (12.52) 0.004 
Mean amount sent by trustees 
If trustor sends 5 
If trustor sends 10 
If trustor sends 15 
If trustor sends 20 
10.77 (5.61) 
16.46 (8.42) 
20.82 (10.90) 
25.54 (12.86) 
9.72 (5.01) 
14.06 (5.65) 
15.79 (6.97) 
20.98 (9.46) 
11.93 (6.03) 
19.10 (10.06) 
24.87 (11.81) 
30.57 (14.23) 
0.012 
0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
Mean percentage of total wealth (amount sent *3 + endowment) sent to trustors 
If trustor sends 5 
If trustor sends 10 
If trustor sends 15 
If trustor sends 20 
Mean % 
30.78 (16.04) 
32.92 (16.84) 
32.02 (16.77) 
31.97 (16.08) 
31.81 (12.97) 
27.78 (14.32) 
28.11 (11.30) 
24.30 (10.72) 
26.22 (11.82) 
26.91  (8.89) 
34.09(17.23) 
38.20(20.13) 
38.26 (18.18) 
38.21 (17.79) 
37.20 (14.58) 
0.012 
0.001 
0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
Percentage of trustees sending more than amount received*3 
If trustor sends 5 
If trustor sends 10 
If trustor sends 15 
If trustor sends 20 
8.43 
3.61 
2.13 
0.60 
4.60 
0 
0 
0 
12.66 
7.59 
3.85 
1.26 
0.063 
0.009 
0.117 
0.294 
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Table 3. Determinants of the amount sent by the trustor 
 
Dependant variable:  
Amount sent by the trustor 
All  
(1) 
All 
(2) 
North 
(3) 
South  
(4)  
Expectation of return from player 
2 
0.052*** 
(0.011) 
-0.204 (0.218) 
-0.069 (0.444) 
-0.345 (0.376) 
-0.044 (0.031) 
9.709 (7.314) 
0.137 (0.775) 
0.010 (0.018) 
0.065# (0.041) 
-0.001*(<0.001) 
-0.065 (0.187) 
-0.035* (0.019) 
-0.358# (0.226) 
0.460** (0.188) 
0.007 (0.005) 
-0.048 (0.221) 
No 
0.052***(0.011) 
0.082*** (0.016) 
- 
-1.273* (0.776) 
-0.468 (0.593) 
-0.075 (0.054) 
10.762 (12.761) 
-0.266(1.201) 
0.050 (0.044) 
<0.001 (0.065) 
<-0.001 (0.001) 
-0.321 (0.394) 
-0.024 (0.025) 
0.006 (0.431) 
0.482 (0.368) 
-0.003 (0.010) 
0.539 (0.468) 
Yes 
0.037*** 
(0.013) 
- 
0.593 (0.710) 
-0.542 (0.572) 
0.007 (0.047) 
13.519* (8.165) 
1.127 (1.211) 
0.041 (0.030) 
0.092 (0.098) 
-0.001 (0.001) 
0.367 (0.381) 
-0.073 (0.048) 
-0.400 (0.410) 
0.645**(0.284) 
0.033 (0.023) 
-0.983 (0.808) 
Yes 
South (=1) 
Probability weighting (α) 
Risk aversion (σ) 
Loss aversion (λ) 
Time discounting rate (r) 
Present bias (β) 
Number of acquaintances 
Age 
Age squared 
Female (=1) 
Years of education 
First job being in agriculture (=1) 
Having a second job (=1) 
Total income (/1000) 
Relative income 
Village fixed effects 
- 
-0.069 (0.465) 
-0.355 (0.382) 
-0.035 (0.032) 
9.456 (7.189) 
0.164 (0.765) 
0.029 (0.023) 
0.062 (0.044) 
-0.001# (<0.001) 
-0.043 (0.218) 
-0.045**(0.021) 
-0.344# (0.249) 
0.557***(0.197) 
0.008 (0.008) 
-0.100 (0.351) 
Yes 
Number of observations 
Wald Chi squared 
156 
59.98 
156 
66.60 
78 
74.53 
78 
36.06 
p> Chi squared                     0.000                              0.000 0.000 0.007 
Pseudo R2 
Log pseudolikelihood 
0.144 
-176.105 
0.152 
-174.4 
0.260 
-72.162 
0.138 
-91.621 
 
Note: These regressions test ordered probit models. Model (1) includes only 156 observations due to a lack of 
information regarding income and remittances for 10 participants in the 2002 household survey data. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. *** indicate significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level, and # at 
the 12% level. 
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Table 4. Determinants of the percentage of wealth returned to the trustor 
 
Dependent variable: 
Percentage of wealth returned 
to the trustor 
All 
(1) 
All 
(2) 
North 
(3) 
 South 
(4) 
Conditional amount sent 0.032 (0.087) 0.036 (0.088) -0.179# (0.111) 0.244* (0.133) 
South (=1) 8.231*** (1.954) - - - 
Probability weighting (α) -5.101 (4.178) -3.510 (4.087) -3.222 (5.511) -4.651 (6.626) 
Risk aversion (σ) 7.943** (4.040) 8.089**(3.990) 5.711 (3.754) 12.368*(6.953) 
Loss aversion (λ) -0.290 (0.287) -0.154 (0.330) -0.033 (0.311) -0.373 (0.576) 
Time discounting rate (r)  -73.979 (82.392) -101.653 (78.32) -64.316 (87.093) 4.811 (112.611) 
Present bias (β)  17.087** (7.304) 15.90**(6.847) 3.912 (6.781) 26.969**(12.271) 
Number of acquaintances  0.056 (0.151) -0.136 (0.181) -0.112 (0.248) -0.118 (0.260) 
Age -0.033 (0.399) 0.025 (0.394) -0.459 (0.394) -0.112(1.171) 
Age squared <0.001 (0.004) <0.001 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 0.003 (0.013) 
Female (=1)  -6.999*** (1.731) -4.829***(1.844) -8.607*** (2.098) -2.922 (3.337) 
Years of education  -0.670*** (0.176) -0.534***(0.179) -0.722***(0.091) -0.364 (0.579) 
First job in agriculture (=1) -2.266 (2.157) -3.988*(2.305) -5.355** (2.505) -2.067 (3.656) 
Having a second job (=1) 0.893 (2.045) 0.843 (2.276) 3.773 (2.235) 0.374 (3.836) 
Total income (/1000) -0.029 (0.047) 0.004 (0.077) -0.045 (0.061) -0.025 (0.241) 
Relative income  
Village fixed effects 
Constant 
2.668 (2.347) 
No 
24.463**(11.749) 
1.001 (3.720) 
Yes 
27.69**(12.49) 
3.626 (2.851) 
Yes 
54.464***(12.497) 
0.903 (9.110) 
Yes 
25.456 (31.307) 
Number of observations           595 
F                             4.77 
Prob>F                        0.000 
R2                            0.196 
595 
4.29 
0.000 
0.222 
284 
8.90 
0.000 
0.207 
311 
2.58 
0.002 
0.172 
 
Note: These regressions test OLS models. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, have been clustered at the 
individual level. *** indicate significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and # at the 12% level. 
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FIGURE 
 
 
Figure 1 displays the trustors’ expectations regarding the amount sent back by the trustees, by 
region and amount sent. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Trustors’ expectations regarding the amount sent back from trustees, by region and 
amount sent 
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Appendix 1. Experimental instructions (original in Vietnamese) 
 
Thank you all for taking the time to come today. Today’s session will take as much as 4 hours, so if you 
think you will not be able to stay that long, let us know now. Before we begin, I want to make some 
general comments about what we are doing here today and explain the rules that we must follow. We will 
be playing some games with money. Whatever money you win in the games will be yours to keep and 
take home. 
We will be playing three games. We are about to begin the first game. It is important that you listen as 
carefully as possible. 
If you have any question, please raise your hand and we will answer your questions in private. Please do 
not ask questions to the other participants or talk about the game with them. This is very important. 
Please be sure that you obey this rule. 
Game 1 
 
In this game, your earnings will depend partly on your decisions and partly on chance. There are three 
series of questions. Series 1 consists of 12 questions. Series 2 consists of 14 questions. Series 3 consists 
of 7 questions. So, there are 33 questions in total. In each question, we will offer you two Plans: Plan A 
and Plan B. We would like you to choose either Plan A or Plan B for each question. After you complete 
the record sheet, we put 33 balls in a bingo cage and draw one numbered ball to select 1 question out of 
33 questions. We will play the selected question for real money. For example, if the number 21 ball is 
drawn, we will play Question 21 for real money.  
Once the question is determined, we will put 10 balls in the cage and play the selected question. 
 
Let’s practice with the following question. Please choose either Plan A or Plan B.  
 
Example  
This example is the same as series 1 (questions 1-12). Please look at the record sheet. 
There are two Plans, A and B. There are 10 balls numbered , , , , , , , , , and  in a 
bingo cage. You should choose either A or B. Let's look at question 1. 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
1 VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 68,000 if  
VND 5,000if  
 
 
We will draw one numbered ball out of the cage.  
If Number 1 ball comes out, those who chose Plan A will receive VND 40,000 and those who chose Plan 
B will receive VND 68,000 .  
If Number 3 ball comes out, those who chose Plan A will receive VND 40,000 and those who chose Plan 
B will receive VND 5,000 .  
If Number 6 ball comes out, those who chose Plan A will receive VND 10,000 and those who chose Plan 
B will receive VND 5,000 .  
 
Suppose you choose Plan A from question 1 to question 5 and Plan B from question 6 to question 12. 
Then, you should fill in the record sheet as follows: 
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 Plan A Plan B 
1- 
1 
VND40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 68,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1- 
2 
VND40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 75,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1- 
3 
VND40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 83,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1- 
4 
VND40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 93,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1- 
5 
VND40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 106,500 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
6 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND125,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
7 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 150,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
8 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 185,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
9 
VND 40,000 if 
VND 10,000 if 
VND 220,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
10 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 300,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
11 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 400,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
12 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 600,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
 
I choose plan A for questions 1 -   5 
I choose plan B for questions      6    - 12. 
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If you choose Plan A for all 12 questions, please fill in the record sheet as follows: 
 Plan A Plan B 
1- 
1 
VND40,000 if  
VND10,000 if 
VND 68,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1- 
2 
VND40,000 if  
VND10,000 if 
VND 75,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1- 
3 
VND40,000 if  
VND10,000 if 
VND 83,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1- 
4 
VND40,000 if  
VND10,000 if 
VND 93,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1- 
5 
VND40,000 if  
VND10,000 if 
VND 106,500 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
6 
VND40,000 if  
VND10,000 if 
VND 125,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
7 
VND40,000 if  
VND10,000 if 
VND 150,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
8 
VND40,000 if  
VND10,000 if 
VND 185,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
9 
VND40,000 if  
VND10,000 if 
VND 220,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
10 
VND40,000 if  
VND10,000 if 
VND 300,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
11 
VND40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 400,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
12 
VND40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 600,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
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I choose plan A for questions 1 -12 
 
I choose plan B for questions          - 12. 
If you choose Plan B for all 12 questions, please fill in the record sheet as follows: 
 Plan A Plan B 
1- 
1 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND68,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1- 
2 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if  
VND 75,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1- 
3 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 83,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1- 
4 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 93,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1- 
5 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 106,500 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
6 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 125,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
7 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 150,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
8 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 185,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
9 
VND 40,000 if 
VND 10,000 if 
VND 220,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
10 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 300,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
11 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 400,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
12 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 600,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
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I choose plan A for questions 1 - 
 
I choose plan B for questions    1   - 12. 
 
Now, look at Series 3. In Series 3, you can lose money. 
Example 
This example is the same as question 27. 
There are two Plans, A and B. There are 10 balls numbered , , , , , , , , , and  in a 
bingo cage. You should choose either A or B. 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
27 Receive VND 25,000 if  
Lose VND 4,000 if  
Receive VND 30,000 if  
Lose VND 21,000 if  
 
If Number 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 ball comes out, those who chose Plan A will receive VND 25,000 and those who 
chose Plan B will receive VND 30,000.  
If Number 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10 ball comes out, those who chose Plan A will lose VND 4,000 and those who 
chose Plan B will lose VND 21,000.  
We will subtract money from your earnings from the other games.  
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Record Sheet - Game 1 
Series 1 
 Plan A Plan B 
1- 
1 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 68,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1- 
2 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if  
VND 75,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1- 
3 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 83,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1- 
4 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 93,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1- 
5 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 106,500 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
6 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 125,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
7 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 150,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
8 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 185,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
9 
VND 40,000 if 
VND 10,000 if 
VND 220,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
10 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 300,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
11 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 400,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
1-
12 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 10,000 if 
VND 600,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
Answer: 
I choose Plan A for questions 1 -    
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I choose Plan B for questions          - 12. 
Series 2 
 Plan A Plan B 
2- 
13 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 30,000 if  
VND 54,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
2- 
14 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 30,000 if  
VND 56,000 if 
VND 5,000 if  
   
2- 
15 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 30,000 if  
VND 58,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
2- 
16 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 30,000 if  
VND 60,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
2- 
17 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 30,000 if  
VND 62,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
2- 
18 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 30,000 if  
VND 65,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
2- 
19 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 30,000 if  
VND 68,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
2- 
20 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 30,000 if  
VND 72,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
2- 
21 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 30,000 if  
VND 77,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
2- 
22 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 30,000 if  
VND 83,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
2- 
23 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 30,000 if  
VND 90,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
2- 
24 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 30,000 if  
VND 100,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
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2- 
25 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 30,000 if  
VND 110,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
   
2- 
26 
VND 40,000 if  
VND 30,000 if  
VND 130,000 if  
VND 5,000 if  
Answer: 
I choose Plan A for questions 13 -    
 
I choose Plan B for questions          - 26. 
 
Series 3 
 Plan A Plan B 
3- 
27 
Receive VND 25,000 if  
Lose VND 4,000 if 
Receive VND 30,000 if  
Lose VND 21,000 if 
   
3- 
28 
Receive VND 5,000 if  
Lose VND 4,000 if 
Receive VND 30,000 if  
Lose VND 21,000 if 
   
3-
29 
Receive VND 1,000 if  
Lose VND 4,000 if 
Receive VND 30,000 if  
Lose VND 21,000 if 
   
3-
30 
Receive VND 1,000 if  
Lose VND 4,000 if 
Receive VND 30,000 if  
Lose VND 16,000 if 
   
3-
31 
ReceiveVND 1,000 if  
Lose VND 8,000 if 
Receive VND 30,000 if  
Lose VND 16,000 if 
   
3-
32 
Receive VND 1,000if  
Lose VND 8,000 if 
Receive VND 30,000if  
Lose VND 14,000 if 
 
3-
33 
Receive VND 1,000 if  
Lose VND 8,000 if 
Receive VND 30,000 if  
Lose VND 11,000 if 
 
Answer: 
I choose Plan A for questions 27 - 
 
I choose Plan B for questions          - 33. 
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Game 2 
In this game, you will receive money either today or sometime in the future, depending on the choices 
you make. There are 75 questions. In each question, we will offer you two plans: Plan A and Plan B. We 
would like you to choose either Plan A or Plan B for each question. 
Example  
This example is the same as question 1. Please refer to the record sheet.  
There are 2 Plans, A and B, offered to you.  
If you choose Plan A, you will receive VND 20,000 tomorrow.  
If you choose Plan B, you will receive VND 120,000 in 1 week. 
 
Questions 1 to 5 are one series. If you choose Plan B for question 1 to question 3, and Plan A for 
questions 4 and 5, please answer as follows: 
 Plan A Plan B 
1 Receive VND 20,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
2 Receive VND 40,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
3 Receive VND 60,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
4 Receive VND 80,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
5 Receive VND 100,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
 
I choose Plan A for  4- 5.      I choose Plan B for 1-3 
If you choose Plan A for all 5 questions, please answer as follows: 
 Plan A Plan B 
1 Receive VND 20,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
2 Receive VND 40,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
3 Receive VND 60,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
4 Receive VND 80,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
5 Receive VND 100,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
 
I choose Plan A for    1   - 5.        I choose Plan B for 1 -   
 
If you choose Plan B for all 5 questions, please answer as follows: 
 Plan A Plan B 
1 Receive VND 20,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
2 Receive VND 40,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
3 Receive VND 60,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
4 Receive VND 80,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
5 Receive VND 100,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
 
I choose Plan A for        - 5.         I choose Plan B for 1 -  5 
 
	   56 
 
Please choose either Plan A or Plan B for each of the 75 questions. You will be paid based on one of your 
choices. 
We will put 75 balls in a bingo cage and draw one ball to determine which question will be played for 
real money. For example, if the number 21 ball is drawn, we will do Question 21 for real money. Suppose 
Question 21 is selected, and you choose Plan A in Question 21, you will be paid VND 50,000 tomorrow. 
If you chose Plan B in Question 21, you will receive VND 300,000 in 1 month. 
At the end of the experiment, we will discuss whom the money should be entrusted to until you pick up 
the money. It could be the commune office, the president of women's associations, or someone whom you 
all trust. For each of you, we will put the money in an envelope and write down your name, the amount of 
money you should receive, and the date you should pick it up from the person, and seal it. The entrusted 
person will keep all the envelopes until the pick up date. We will sign the letter of agreement among the 
researchers, the entrusted person and all of you. 
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Record Sheet - Game 2 
 Plan A Plan B 
1 Receive VND 20,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
2 Receive VND 40,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
3 Receive VND 60,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
4 Receive VND 80,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
5 Receive VND 100,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 week 
 
I choose Plan A for           - 5.        I choose Plan B for 1- 
 Plan A Plan B 
6 Receive VND 20,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 month 
7 Receive VND 40,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 month 
8 Receive VND 60,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 month 
9 Receive VND 80,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 month 
10 Receive VND 100,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 1 month 
 
I choose Plan A for    - 10.      I choose Plan B for 6 - 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
11 Receive VND 20,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 3months 
12 Receive VND 40,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 3months 
13 Receive VND 60,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 3months 
14 Receive VND 80,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 3months 
15 Receive VND100,000 tomorrow Receive VND 120,000 in 3months 
 
I choose Plan A for    - 15.     I choose Plan B for 11- 
 Plan A Plan B 
16 Receive VND 50,000 tomorrow Receive VND 300,000 in 1 week 
17 Receive VND 100,000 tomorrow Receive VND 300,000 in 1 week 
18 Receive VND 150,000 tomorrow Receive VND 300,000 in 1 week 
19 Receive VND 200,000 tomorrow Receive VND 300,000 in 1 week 
20 Receive VND 250,000 tomorrow Receive VND 300,000 in 1 week 
I choose Plan A for        - 20.      I choose Plan B for 16-  
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 Plan A Plan B 
21 Receive VND 50,000 tomorrow Receive VND 300,000 in 1 month 
22 Receive VND 100,000 tomorrow Receive VND 300,000 in 1 month 
23 Receive VND 150,000 tomorrow Receive VND 300,000 in 1 month 
24 Receive VND 200,000 tomorrow Receive VND 300,000 in 1 month 
25 Receive VND 250,000 tomorrow Receive VND 300,000 in 1 month 
 
I choose Plan A for  - 25.    I choose Plan B for 21 -  
 
 Plan A Plan B 
26 Receive VND 50,000 tomorrow Receive VND 300,000 in 3months 
27 Receive VND 100,000 tomorrow Receive VND 300,000 in 3months 
28 Receive VND 150,000 tomorrow Receive VND300,000 in 3months 
29 Receive VND 200,000 tomorrow Receive VND 300,000 in 3months 
30 Receive VND 250,000 tomorrow Receive VND 300,000 in 3months 
 
I choose Plan A for    - 30.      I choose Plan B for 26 - 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
31 Receive VND 5,000 tomorrow Receive VND 30,000 in 1 week 
32 Receive VND 10,000 tomorrow Receive VND 30,000 in 1 week 
33 Receive VND 15,000 tomorrow Receive VND 30,000 in 1 week 
34 Receive VND 20,000 tomorrow Receive VND 30,000 in 1 week 
35 Receive VND 25,000 tomorrow Receive VND 30,000 in 1 week 
 
I choose Plan A for    - 35.      I choose Plan B for 31 - 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
36 Receive VND 5,000 tomorrow Receive VND 30,000 in 1 month 
37 Receive VND 10,000 tomorrow Receive VND 30,000 in 1 month 
38 Receive VND 15,000 tomorrow Receive VND 30,000 in 1 month 
39 Receive VND 20,000 tomorrow Receive VND 30,000 in 1 month 
40 Receive VND 25,000 tomorrow Receive VND 30,000 in 1 month 
 
I choose Plan A for         - 40.    I choose Plan B for 36 - 
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 Plan A Plan B 
41 Receive VND 5,000 tomorrow Receive VND 30,000 in 3 months 
42 Receive VND 10,000 tomorrow Receive VND 30,000 in 3 months 
43 Receive VND 15,000 tomorrow Receive VND 30,000 in 3 months 
44 Receive VND 20,000 tomorrow Receive VND 30,000 in 3 months 
45 Receive VND 25,000 tomorrow Receive VND 30,000 in 3 months 
 
I choose Plan A for  - 45.    I choose Plan B for 41 -  
 
 Plan A Plan B 
46 Receive VND 40,000 tomorrow Receive VND 240,000 in 3 days 
47 Receive VND 80,000 tomorrow Receive VND 240,000 in 3 days 
48 Receive VND 120,000 tomorrow Receive VND 240,000 in 3 days 
49 Receive VND 160,000 tomorrow Receive VND 240,000 in 3 days 
50 Receive VND 200,000 tomorrow Receive VND 240,000 in 3 days 
 
I choose Plan A for    - 50.      I choose Plan B for 46 - 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
51 Receive VND 40,000 tomorrow Receive VND 240,000 in 2weeks 
52 Receive VND 80,000 tomorrow Receive VND 240,000 in 2weeks 
53 Receive VND 120,000 tomorrow Receive VND 240,000 in 2weeks 
54 Receive VND 160,000 tomorrow Receive VND 240,000 in 2weeks 
55 Receive VND 200,000 tomorrow Receive VND 240,000 in 2weeks 
 
I choose Plan A for    - 55.      I choose Plan B for 51 - 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
56 Receive VND 40,000 tomorrow Receive VND 240,000 in 2months 
57 Receive VND 80,000 tomorrow Receive VND 240,000 in 2months 
58 Receive VND 120,000 tomorrow Receive VND 240,000 in 2months 
59 Receive VND 160,000 tomorrow Receive VND 240,000 in 2months 
60 Receive VND 200,000 tomorrow Receive VND 240,000 in 2months 
 
I choose Plan A for        - 60.     I choose Plan B for 56 - 
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 Plan A Plan B 
61 Receive VND 10,000 tomorrow Receive VND 60,000 in 3 days 
62 Receive VND 20,000 tomorrow Receive VND 60,000 in 3 days 
63 Receive VND 30,000 tomorrow Receive VND 60,000 in 3 days 
64 Receive VND 40,000 tomorrow Receive VND 60,000 in 3 days 
65 Receive VND 50,000 tomorrow Receive VND 60,000 in 3 days 
 
I choose Plan A for  - 65.    I choose Plan B for 61 -  
 
 Plan A Plan B 
66 Receive VND 10,000 tomorrow Receive VND 60,000 in 2 weeks 
67 Receive VND 20,000 tomorrow Receive VND 60,000 in 2 weeks 
68 Receive VND 30,000 tomorrow Receive VND 60,000 in 2 weeks 
69 Receive VND 40,000 tomorrow Receive VND 60,000 in 2 weeks 
70 Receive VND 50,000 tomorrow Receive VND 60,000 in 2 weeks 
 
I choose Plan A for    - 70.      I choose Plan B for 66 - 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
71 Receive VND 10,000 tomorrow Receive VND 60,000 in 2 months 
72 Receive VND 20,000 tomorrow Receive VND 60,000 in 2 months 
73 Receive VND 30,000 tomorrow Receive VND 60,000 in 2 months 
74 Receive VND 40,000 tomorrow Receive VND 60,000 in 2 months 
75 Receive VND 50,000 tomorrow Receive VND 60,000 in 2 months 
 
I choose Plan A for    - 75.      I choose Plan B for 71 - 
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Game 3 
This experiment is played by pairs. Each pair is made up of a person called A and another person, called 
B. Each of you will be paired with one of the other participants. However, nobody knows in advance with 
whom you will be playing. 
We will provide each of you with a name tag which color is white or red. After you have completed the 
decisions for this game, we will toss a coin. If the head appears, those with a red name tag will be person 
A, whereas those with a white name tag will be person B. If the tail appears, those with a red name tag 
will be person B, whereas those with a white name tag will be person A. 
We will proceed with this experiment as follows. 
Each of you will be given VND 20,000. You will make decisions depending on whether you are person A 
or person B. Please note that at this moment you do not know if you are person A or person B. Thus, pay 
attention to the decision you make both when you play the role of A and when you play the role of B. 
You play the role of person A: 
You can send some amount of your VND 20,000to person B. You can send VND 5,000, VND 
10,000,VND 15,000, VND 20,000, or nothing. This amount will then be tripled and given to person B. 
Person B can then send some money to you. Note that person B can send you any amount of money that 
she or he wants. 
You play the role of person B: 
In addition to the VND 20,000 we give you at the beginning of this experiment, you will receive some 
amount of money from person A. You can refer to Tables 1-4 when making your decisions. However, 
you can totally decide how much money to send to person A. These amounts can be different from those 
in Tables 1-4. 
How to make decisions? 
Each of you will be given a record sheet to write down your decisions. You will make decisions for two 
scenarios. In the first scenario, you play the role of person A. In the second scenario, you play the role of 
person B. Please note that you do not know whether you are person A or person B at this moment. 
After all of you have finished making decisions, we will toss a coin to know which role you are assigned 
to. For example, if the head appears and your name tag is in red, you will be person A. In this case, the 
actual payment you receive will depend on the decision you made in the first scenario. Likewise, if you 
are person B, your actual payment will depend on the decisions you made in the second scenario. Thus, 
be careful to make decisions for both scenarios. 
After having collected the record sheets from all of you, we will toss a coin to know if you are person A 
or person B. If you are person A, we will randomly assign you with someone else who is person B. Your 
payoff will depend on the decision you make in the first scenario as well as on person B’s decisions for 
the second scenario. If you are person B, we will randomly assign you with someone who is person A. 
Your payoff will depend on the decisions you make in the second scenario as well as on person A’s 
decision for the first scenario.  
Now, let’s work together on the following example. We prepared Tables 1-4for your references only. 
Example 
Please refer to Table 1. Suppose that person A sends VND 5,000to person B. This amount is tripled. 
Hence, person B receives VND 15,000 (3 x 5,000 = 15,000) in addition to the initial amount of VND 
20,000. At this point, person A has VND 15,000 (20,000 - 5,000) and B has VND 35,000 (20,000 
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+15,000). Now, person B will decide to send money to A, and if so, how much. 
If person B sends zero, then person A will earn VND 15,000, and person B will earn VND 35,000 in this 
game. 
If person B sends VND 10,000, then person A will earn VND 25,000 (15,000 + 10, 000), and person B 
will earn VND 25,000 (35,000 - 10,000) in this game. 
Please note that person A is allowed to send one of the following amounts: VND 5,000, VND 10,000, 
VND 15,000, VND 20,000, or zero. Person B can decide to send any amount of money he/she wants.  
----------- 
Record Sheets 
You will make decisions based on whether you are person A or person B. You could be person A or 
person B, so be careful with your decision. 
You play the role of person A.  
You have VND 20,000. You have the chance to send a portion of VND 20,000 to person B. You could 
send VND 5,000, VND 10,000, VND 15,000, VND 20,000, or nothing. Whatever amount you decide to 
send to person B will be tripled before it is passed on to person B.  
You play the role of person B.  
As person B, you are also given VND 20,000. Beside, you will receive some money from person A. You 
must decide how much money you want to send back to person A, or you may send nothing.  
How is the game conducted? 
After collecting all the record sheets, we will randomly divide you into two groups: group A (play the 
role of person A) or group B (play the role of person B). The members of both groups should be in equal 
number. If the total number of participants is odd, then one will play with the project assistant. 
The amount will be sent based on your decision in the record sheet below. 
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Record Sheet - Person A 
 
I want to send VND     0 
5,000 
10,000 
15,000 
20,000 
(………………….) to person B. 
The money will be tripled (x3), so person B will get VND (…………………) in addition to his/her initial 
VND 20,000.  
I think person B will return VND (……………….) to me.  
Your decision will remain confidential. 
 
Record Sheet - Person B 
 
If person A sends me nothing, of 0 to VND 20,000 
I will send him/her VND (………………..). 
 
If person A sends me VND 5,000, of 0 to VND 35,000 (20,000+ 5,000 x 3) 
I will return VND (………………..) . 
 
If person A sends me VND 10,000, of 0 to VND 50,000 (20,000+ 10,000 x 3) 
I will return VND (………………..) . 
 
If person A sends me VND 15,000, of 0 to VND 65,000 (20,000+ 15,000 x 3) 
I will return VND (………………..) . 
 
If person A sends me VND 20,000, of 0 to VND 80,000 (20,000+ 20,000 x 3) 
I will return VND (………………..) . 
 
Your decisions will remain confidential. 
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Table 1 
Suppose you send VND 5,000to person B. So, B receives a total of 3 x 5,000 = VND 15,000 on top of 
VDN 20,000 we give to her or him.  
 The money you earn The money B earns Total 
If B sends nothing 15,000 35,000 50,000 
If B sendsVND 5,000 20,000 30,000 50,000 
If B sends VND 10,000 25,000 25,000 50,000 
If B sends VND 15,000 30,000 20,000 50,000 
Table 2 
Suppose you send VND 10,000to person B. So, B receives a total of 3 x 10,000 = VND30,000 on top of 
VDN 20,000 we give to her or him.  
  The money you earn The money B earns Total 
If B sends nothing 10,000 50,000 60,000 
If B sends VND 5,000  15,000 45,000 60,000 
If B sends VND 10,000 20,000 40,000 60,000 
If B sends VND 15,000 25,000 35,000 60,000 
If B sends VND 20,000 30,000 30,000 60,000 
If B sends VND 25,000 35,000 25,000 60,000 
If B sends VND 30,000 40,000 20,000 60,000 
Table 3 
Suppose you send VND 15,000to person B. So, B receives a total of 3 x 15,000 = VND 45,000 on top of 
VND 20,000 we give to her or him. 
  The money you earn The money B earns Total 
If B sends nothing 5,000 65,000 70,000 
If B sends VND 5,000  10,000 60,000 70,000 
If B sends VND 10,000 15,000 55,000 70,000 
If B sends VND 15,000 20,000 50,000 70,000 
If B sends VND 20,000 25,000 45,000 70,000 
If B sends VND 25,000 30,000 40,000 70,000 
If B sends VND 30,000 35,000 35,000 70,000 
Table 4 
Suppose you send VND 20,000to person B. So, B receives a total of 3 x 20,000 = VND 60,000 on top of 
VND 20,000 we give to her or him. 
  The money you earn The money B earns Total 
If B sends nothing 0 80,000 80,000 
If B sends VND 10,000  10,000 70,000 80,000 
If B sends VND 20,000 20,000 60,000 80,000 
If B sends VND 30,000 30,000 50,000 80,000 
If B sends VND 40,000 40,000 40,000 80,000 
If B sends VND 50,000 50,000 30,000 80,000 
If B sends VND 60,000 60,000 20,000 80,000 
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Appendix 2. Theoretical predictions  
 
In line with standard models of trust and reciprocity (Cox, 2004) and Charness and Rabin 
(2002), we assume that the utility of the trustor U1( .)  takes the following form: 
U1 (Y – s + r, Y + 3s - r) 
where Y is the initial endowment (20,000 VND in our study), s is the amount sent by the 
trustor, and r is the amount returned by the trustee. 
For example, U1( .)  can take the following functional form: 
U1 (Y,s,r) = ln(20 – s + r) + α2  ln(20 + 3s - r) 
where ! 2   represents how much the trustor cares about the trustee. 
Likewise, we define the trustee’s utility U2 ( .)  as follows: 
U2 (Y + 3s – r, Y – s + r) 
For example,  U2 ( .) can take the following functional form: 
U2 (Y,s,r) = ln(20 + 3s - r) + α1  ln(20 - s + r) 
where  represents how much the trustee cares about the trustor.  
The trustee chooses to send the amount  that maximizes his utility; likewise, the 
trustor chooses the amount of return to maximize his utility. To solve the Subgame Perfect 
Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of the game , we follow the standard approach by 
reasoning backward. We define the trustee’s optimal choice , and then solve the 
utility maximization for the trustor, such that:  
s* = argmax
s
U2 Y ! s + r(s),Y + 3s ! r(s)( )  
We note that the SPNE of the game  only depends on , and is 
independent on the choice set of the trustor, i.e  as in the standard trust game or  
as in our design. Therefore, a rational agent should make the same decision – independent of 
whether or not the initial endowment is included. n  
 
 
!1
s*
r*
(s*,r*)
r* = r(s)
(s*,r*) Y ,  !1,  and ! 2
3s 3s +Y
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Appendix 3. Estimates of the parameter for the curvature of power value function and of 
the probability sensitivity parameter 
 
Table A1. Switching points (questions) in series 1 and 2 and the ranges of σ (parameter for the curvature 
of power value function) 
 
 
Switching question in series 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Series 2 Lower 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
1 1.4 1.33  1.27  1.21  1.15  1.05  0.97  
2 1.3 1.23 1.39 1.17 1.3 1.12 1.22 1.06 1.15 0.99 1.09 0.91 1.03 
3 1.22 1.16 1.29 1.1 1.21 1.05 1.14 0.99 1.07 0.92 1 0.85 0.94 
4 1.16 1.11 1.21 1.05 1.13 1 1.06 0.93 1 0.86 0.94 0.79 0.88 
5 1.12 1.05 1.13 0.99 1.05 0.93 1 0.87 0.94 0.8 0.89 0.75 0.83 
6 1.04 0.97 1.07 0.91 1.01 0.86 0.96 0.8 0.91 0.74 0.85 0.69 0.8 
7 0.96 0.9 1 0.85 0.95 0.8 0.89 0.75 0.84 0.7 0.79 0.65 0.74 
8 0.89 0.84 0.95 0.79 0.9 0.74 0.84 0.69 0.79 0.64 0.74 0.6 0.68 
9 0.82 0.77 0.88 0.73 0.82 0.68 0.77 0.63 0.73 0.59 0.68 0.54 0.62 
10 0.76 0.71 0.81 0.67 0.75 0.62 0.71 0.58 0.66 0.53 0.62 0.49 0.56 
11 0.7 0.66 0.74 0.62 0.69 0.57 0.64 0.53 0.6 0.48 0.56 0.44 0.51 
12 0.68 0.59 0.67 0.55 0.62 0.51 0.58 0.47 0.54 0.43 0.5 0.38 0.46 
13 0.6 0.55 0.6 0.51 0.55 0.47 0.52 0.43 0.48 0.39 0.45 0.35 0.4 
14 0.51 0.47 0.55 0.43 0.51 0.39 0.47 0.35 0.43 0.31 0.39 0.28 0.35 
Never 0.41  0.47  0.43  0.4  0.37  0.34  0.3 
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(cont.)  
 8 9 10 11 12 Never 
Series 
2 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
1 0.91 
 
0.86  0.79  0.74  0.88  0.62 
2 0.84 0.97 0.8 0.9 0.72 0.85 0.66 0.77 0.61 0.71 0.52 
3 0.78 0.89 0.75 0.83 0.67 0.77 0.62 0.72 0.56 0.66 0.47 
4 0.73 0.83 0.7 0.77 0.62 0.72 0.57 0.66 0.52 0.61 0.43 
5 0.7 0.78 0.65 0.73 0.6 0.68 0.55 0.62 0.5 0.57 0.39 
6 0.64 0.73 0.59 0.67 0.54 0.64 0.49 0.57 0.45 0.53 0.36 
7 0.6 0.68 0.55 0.62 0.51 0.59 0.46 0.52 0.41 0.48 0.32 
8 0.55 0.62 0.5 0.57 0.46 0.54 0.41 0.48 0.37 0.44 0.29 
9 0.5 0.57 0.45 0.52 0.41 0.49 0.36 0.43 0.32 0.4 0.26 
10 0.45 0.52 0.4 0.47 0.36 0.45 0.32 0.39 0.27 0.36 0.23 
11 0.4 0.46 0.36 0.42 0.32 0.4 0.28 0.35 0.23 0.32 0.19 
12 0.34 0.41 0.31 0.37 0.26 0.36 0.24 0.31 0.2 0.27 0.15 
13 0.31 0.36 0.27 0.33 0.23 0.3 0.2 0.26 0.16 0.22 0.1 
14 0.24 0.32 0.22 0.28 0.18 0.27 0.16 0.22 0.13 0.19 0.08 
Never 
 0.27  0.24  0.2  0.16  0.13 0.04 
Note: “never” indicates the cases in which a participant never switched to plan B. 
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Table A2. Switching points (questions) in series 1 and 2 and the ranges of α (probability sensitivity 
parameter in Prelec’s weighting function) 
 
Switching question in series 1  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Series 2 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
1 0.7 0.65  0.72  0.77  0.83  0.89  0.95  
2 0.64 0.6 0.7 0.67 0.76 0.72 0.8 0.77 0.87 0.83 0.93 0.89 0.98 
3 0.59 0.56 0.64 0.61 0.71 0.68 0.76 0.74 0.81 0.79 0.87 0.83 0.94 
4 0.54 0.51 0.61 0.58 0.65 0.64 0.7 0.69 0.76 0.74 0.83 0.79 0.88 
5 0.51 0.48 0.56 0.55 0.61 0.61 0.67 0.66 0.73 0.7 0.79 0.75 0.83 
6 0.47 0.45 0.52 0.5 0.58 0.54 0.63 0.59 0.69 0.65 0.75 0.71 0.8 
7 0.42 0.4 0.49 0.45 0.54 0.51 0.59 0.56 0.64 0.61 0.69 0.67 0.74 
8 0.39 0.36 0.45 0.42 0.5 0.47 0.55 0.52 0.6 0.57 0.65 0.63 0.7 
9 0.34 0.32 0.39 0.38 0.44 0.43 0.49 0.48 0.54 0.53 0.59 0.58 0.65 
10 0.29 0.26 0.35 0.31 0.39 0.37 0.44 0.43 0.48 0.48 0.54 0.54 0.59 
11 0.26 0.22 0.31 0.27 0.36 0.32 0.4 0.37 0.44 0.43 0.49 0.49 0.54 
12 0.21 0.19 0.26 0.24 0.32 0.28 0.36 0.31 0.4 0.37 0.44 0.43 0.49 
13 0.15 0.15 0.2 0.2 0.25 0.23 0.31 0.27 0.35 0.34 0.4 0.4 0.43 
14 0.11 0.07 0.16 0.13 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.23 0.3 0.26 0.35 0.32 0.4 
Never 0.07  0.12  0.15  0.19  0.25  0.3  0.33 
(cont.)  
 
Series 2 
8 9 10 11 12 Never 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
1 1.01  1.06  1.1  1.18  1.23  1.41 
2 0.94 1.05 1.01 1.09 1.05 1.14 1.12 1.19 1.16 1.26 1.35 
3 0.9 0.98 0.97 1.03 1 1.08 1.06 1.13 1.11 1.21 1.28 
4 0.86 0.92 0.92 0.97 0.95 1.03 1.02 1.08 1.07 1.15 1.22 
5 0.82 0.88 0.88 0.93 0.91 0.98 0.98 1.02 1.03 1.09 1.2 
6 0.77 0.85 0.83 0.9 0.86 0.95 0.93 0.97 0.97 1.05 1.14 
7 0.73 0.79 0.78 0.84 0.81 0.89 0.87 0.94 0.91 1 1.07 
8 0.68 0.75 0.73 0.8 0.76 0.86 0.82 0.91 0.86 0.96 1.03 
9 0.63 0.7 0.68 0.75 0.7 0.81 0.76 0.85 0.81 0.9 0.99 
10 0.59 0.65 0.63 0.7 0.65 0.76 0.71 0.79 0.77 0.84 0.91 
11 0.54 0.59 0.58 0.65 0.61 0.7 0.67 0.73 0.73 0.77 0.85 
12 0.49 0.55 0.53 0.59 0.55 0.64 0.62 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.81 
13 0.43 0.49 0.47 0.54 0.52 0.58 0.58 0.62 0.6 0.68 0.75 
14 0.38 0.46 0.42 0.48 0.45 0.52 0.52 0.59 0.54 0.63 0.67 
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Never 
 
0.38  0.42  0.45  0.52  0.56 0.6 
Note: “never” indicates the cases in which a participant never switched to plan B 
 
 
 
Table A3. Switching point (question) in series 3 and the ranges of λ (loss aversion parameter) 
 
Switching point σ = 0.2 σ = 0.6 σ = 1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
λ > 0.14 
0.14 <λ >1.26 
1.26 <λ > 1.88 
1.88 <λ > 2.31 
2.31 <λ > 4.32 
4.32 <λ > 5.43 
5.43 <λ > 9.78 
λ > 0.20 
0.20 <λ > 1.38 
1.38 <λ > 1.71 
1.71 <λ > 2.25 
2.25 <λ > 3.73 
3.73 <λ > 4.82 
4.82 <λ > 9.13 
λ > 0.29 
0.29 <λ > 1.53 
1.53 <λ > 1.71 
1.71 <λ > 2.42 
2.42 <λ > 3.63 
3.63 <λ > 4.83 
4.83 <λ > 9.67 
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Appendix 4 
Table A4. Determinants of the trustors’ expected returned amount from trustees 
Dependent variable: 
Expected returned amount 
All 
(1) 
All 
(2) 
North 
 (3) 
South 
(4)  
South (=1) 
Probability weighting (α) 
Risk aversion (σ) 
Loss aversion (λ) 
Time discounting rate (r)  
Present bias (β)  
Number of acquaintances  
Age 
Age squared 
Female (=1)  
Years of education  
First job being in agriculture (=1) 
Having a second Job (=1) 
Total income (/1000) 
Relative income  
Village fixed effects 
Constant 
5.210**(2.445) 
-0.490 (3.468) 
3.294 (3.593) 
-0.343 (0.271) 
47.392 (79.306) 
-0.424 (7.910) 
0.088 (0.182) 
-0.245 (0.422) 
0.004 (0.004) 
-3.065*(1.742) 
-0.078 (0.196) 
-1.529 (1.997) 
2.616 (2.001) 
-0.016 (0.040) 
1.093 (1.972) 
No 
15.866 (14.507) 
- 
0.021 (3.271) 
3.269 (3.275) 
-0.004 (0.275) 
18.80 (75.26) 
3.522 (7.177) 
-0.065 (0.224) 
-0.090 (0.485) 
0.002 (0.005) 
-3.419*(1.748) 
0.062 (0.267) 
  -2.479 (1.988) 
1.838 (2.176) 
-0.012 (0.062) 
0.771 (2.775) 
Yes 
   11.98 (15.50) 
- 
-0.018 (4.902) 
1.799 (4.209) 
-0.119 (0.463) 
55.868 (133.950) 
-3.288 (11.833) 
0.199 (0.434) 
-0.204 (0.478) 
0.002 (0.005) 
-6.284***(2.135) 
-0.136 (0.284) 
-1.925 (3.458) 
3.168 (2.889) 
-0.038 (0.067) 
2.313 (3.199) 
Yes 
17.863 (17.425 
- 
-1.333 (5.504) 
5.114 (4.948) 
0.166 (0.503) 
44.260 (86.684) 
5.093 (11.257) 
-0.097 (0.295) 
-0.950 (1.634) 
0.013 (0.018) 
-0.503 (3.955) 
0.511 (0.550) 
-3.812 (3.534) 
1.811 (3.625) 
-0.043 (0.193) 
0.559 (6.865) 
Yes 
28.879 (41.650) 
Number of observations 
F 
156 
2.26 
156 
2.78 
78 
1.06 
78 
2.56 
p>F                                     0.007 0.000 0.414 0.004 
R2 0.127 0.257 0.185 0.310 
 
Note: The regressions test OLS models. They include 156 observations due to a lack of information regarding 
income and remittances for 10 participants in the 2002 household survey data. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** indicate significance at the 1% level ,** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 
 
